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Abstract: Legal scholars, economists and other social scientist often refer to the idea that coun-
tries can be classified into a number of ‘legal families’ or ‘legal origins’. Yet, this research is un-
satisfactory as regards the actual classifications of the legal systems of the world. It is the aim of 
this paper to fill this gap and to develop a more robust taxonomy of legal systems. This taxon-
omy is based on a new dataset of 156 countries that is subsequently analysed with tools of net-
work analysis. Applying cluster optimisation, this paper finds that the world’s legal systems can 
be divided into four clusters. It displays those clusters in a map, akin to the Inglehart-Welzel cul-
tural map. It is suggested that those findings have important implications, not only for our under-
standing of the legal world, but also for the feasibility of legal transplants and harmonisation.  
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Varieties of Legal Systems: Towards a New Global Taxonomy 
 
 
Mathias M. Siems∗ 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Researchers in many academic disciplines aim to classify countries, for example, trying to iden-
tify language families (Lewis et al., 2013), cultural groups (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010), varie-
ties of economic systems (Nielsen, 2011) and forms of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Given that there are both differences and similarities between laws across countries, it is also 
worth exploring whether a similar global classification can be made for legal systems. 
It is the aim of this paper to develop such an evidence-based quantitative taxonomy of the le-
gal systems of the world. As it will explain, this approach is different from previous taxonomies 
of ‘legal families’ or ‘legal origins’ as those are not based on a robust method of classifying 
countries. Thus, this paper aspires to fill this gap in the literature which should be interest for in-
stitutional economists, legal scholars, political and other social scientists. In developing this new 
global taxonomy the paper aims to strike the right balance between keeping the familiar and pre-
senting new ways of classifying the legal systems of the world in order to make it an attractive 
tool for other researchers. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the current literature and presents the 
theoretical framework that underlies the proposed taxonomy. Section 3 discusses the variables of 
this paper and presents descriptive statistics for a new dataset of 156 countries. Section 4 shows 
how tools of network analysis can be used to display a network of the world’s legal systems. It 
also re-examines the alleged relevance of legal-origin classifications. Section 5 calculates, pre-
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sents and analyses clusters of legal systems, identifying the four clusters ‘European Legal Cul-
ture’, ‘Mixed Legal Systems’, the ‘Rule by Law’, and the ‘Weak Law in Transition’. Section 6 
concludes with reflections on possible further research in this area. 
 
 
2. Literature review and theoretical framework 
 
2.1 Previous research on ‘legal families’ and ‘legal origins’ 
 
Legal scholars, economists and other social scientist often refer to the idea that countries can be 
classified into a number of ‘legal families’ or ‘legal origins’. Legal scholars call those categories 
‘legal families’ and distinguish between common law, civil law, religious legal systems (such as 
countries of Islamic law), and sometimes add the groups of East Asian law, African law and so-
cialist legal systems (for overviews see, e.g., Siems, 2014: 74-80; Pargendler 2012; Husa 2012: 
493-498). However, they do not attempt to classify all countries of the world: rather, in the main 
comparative law textbooks, the legal family taxonomy serves as a ‘didactic device’ to outline 
selected similarities and differences between selected countries (David, 1985: 21; also: Zweigert 
and Kötz, 1998: 72: ‘a rough and ready device’). While some legal scholars refer to the idea of 
mapping the legal systems of the world (Twining, 1999; Bavinck and Woodman, 2009; Varga, 
2010), this is done without producing actual graphic representation. 
 A notable exception is the Website ‘www.juriglobe.ca’ of a research group of comparative 
lawyers at the University of Ottawa. This site divides the world into the categories ‘civil law’, 
‘common law’, ‘Muslim law’, ‘customary law’ and mixtures of those. Yet, the problem is that 
the precise classifications are left unexplained. For example, the statement that Saudi Arabia is 
‘Muslim law’, Iran a mixture of ‘Muslim law’ and ‘civil law’, the UAE a mixture of ‘Muslim 
law’ and ‘customary law’, and Kuwait a mixture of ‘Muslim law’, ‘civil law’ and ‘customary 
law’,1 invites the criticism that the researchers would need to have explained precisely what jus-
tifies the classifications of these countries. 
Since the mid 1990s financial economists have employed the categories of English, French 
German, Nordic and Socialist legal origins. The context of this research is the question whether 
                                                 
1
 http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/class-poli/droit-musulman.php. 
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and how differences in legal rules may account for differences in financial development. For ex-
ample, a number of influential studies by Djankov et al. and La Porta et al. scrutinised the effect 
of country differences as related to investor protection. Most of these studies found that legal 
rules have indeed a quantifiable effect on financial development. Moreover, the quality of legal 
rules is said to vary systematically between ‘legal origins’: in particular, it was found that the le-
gal model of ‘English legal origin’ (i.e., common law) countries is more conducive to financial 
development than that of other legal origins (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et al., 2008; see 
also Armour et al., 2009; Siems and Deakin, 2010, for different results). 
However, this ‘legal origin’ taxonomy (summarised in La Porta et al., 2008) is highly prob-
lematic. If one traces the source of this taxonomy, there are no substantive explanations why a 
particular country is considered as belonging to one of these categories – in particular no histori-
cal analysis which the ‘origin’ terminology appears to indicate. Rather, classifying legal systems 
is simply based on whether, according to a book on foreign law (Reynolds and Flores, 1989), the 
main codes of these legal systems follow a particular model – and, if there are no such codes, the 
country is typically seen as part of the English legal origin. It can therefore be shown that about 
80% of these classifications into legal origins are not self-evident (Siems, 2007: 62-70; similar 
Garoupa and Pargendler, 2014) – while the authors of the legal-origin studies provide no evi-
dence for their classification of individual countries (or why there are only these specific legal 
origins in the first place). 
 
2.2 Rationales for taxonomies of legal systems 
 
Taxonomies of countries simplify reality, but there are good reasons why such simplification can 
be a useful endeavour. From a general methodological perspective they can be related to Karl 
Popper’s view that scientific knowledge grows by way of ‘conjectures and refutations’ (Popper, 
1963). Since taxonomies can never be a perfect representation of the complexities of the real 
world, they can be seen as, more or less refined, conjectures – and it is then the task of subse-
quent researchers to critically scrutinise these conjectures and try to develop better ones. 
More specifically, the legal taxonomies of countries have a descriptive, analytical and norma-
tive dimension. Legal scholars tend to highlight the descriptive value as legal classifications can 
facilitate the description and understanding of foreign laws. For example, a researcher who 
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analyses legal systems that belong to the same legal family can focus on the remaining differ-
ences (Hertel, 2009: 128; Twining, 2000: 152, 178), and an aspiring comparatists who tries to 
understand the law of a particular foreign country can, given its similarities to his or her own 
country, then concentrate on the remaining differences between those countries’ laws (Bogdan, 
1994: 38). Subsequently, as research goes deeper into the specifics of particular countries, it will 
then, however, be necessary to go beyond the initial taxonomy (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998: 72).  
Researchers may also analyse how such legal classifications are related to non-legal ones. For 
example, in economic geography, a distinction is made between spatial, institutional, cultural, 
organisational and relational proximity (Coe et al., 2010: 147-148). Geographers are primarily 
interested in the spatial aspect and lawyers in the institutional one. But if one combines those 
taxonomies, it may be possible to say whether legal traditions are conditioned by spatial or other 
non-legal circumstances. 
Taxonomies can also have a normative dimension. For example, if it is assumed that belong-
ing to the English legal origin may have possible advantages (see previous section), it could be 
advisable for countries of other legal origins to shift closer to the model of the common law. An 
alternative normative position is that what matters are the familiarity with and the adaptation of 
the transplanted legal system (Berkowitz et al., 2003a and 2003b; similar for policy transfers, 
Lalenis et al., 2002). Here too then one could argue that legal taxonomies provide useful norma-
tive information as they can help to illuminate the degree of familiarity between different legal 
systems.  
 
2.3 Challenges and possible criteria 
 
A modern critique of legal families is that, in today’s world, law has become predominantly in-
ternational, transnational, or even global, so that looking at the way laws differ between coun-
tries is seen as less important (see Husa, 2004; Reimann, 2001). But, it would also go too far to 
claim that all country differences have disappeared. Moreover, a taxonomy – such as the one 
proposed in this paper – can precisely be a means to establish how far we can still classify legal 
systems into plausible groups of countries today. 
Further, it may be objected that there cannot be just one classification of legal systems. There 
is bound to be a degree of subjectivity since, to classify countries, means making a decision 
about some common aspects that matter, while disregarding others (Peters and Schwenke, 2000: 
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826). A further complication is that most countries can be called ‘vertically divided legal sys-
tems’ since different areas of law may have been influenced by different foreign legal models 
(Siems, 2014: 89-92); thus, there may be various classifications, depending on the area of law 
that is the main focus of the researcher in question. 
However, comparative lawyers also take the view that it is possible to approach comparative 
law at the macro level (see, e.g., Zweigert and Kötz, 1998: 4-5), namely that it is legitimate to 
compare legal systems at the country level as a whole since they consist of more than their indi-
vidual components. Correspondingly, the comparative-law literature tends to agree on the criteria 
that form the bases of classifications of legal systems. The main idea is to use criteria that are 
good indicators for the entire legal system – as opposed to possible idiosyncrasies of a particular 
area of law – and that are relatively ‘permanent’ and ‘determinant’, not merely ‘incidental’ or 
‘fungible’ (Luts, 2011: 41; Constantinesco, 1983: 241). Common features of the legal family 
taxonomies are therefore the level of codification, differences in legal style and mentality, the 
effectiveness of the law and the law’s underlying rationales (Husa, 2012: 492-493; also Vander-
linden, 1995: 328, identifying 14 criteria used in the comparative-law literature). 
As a result, any choice of variables should aim to capture such determinant legal features. In 
this respect, the term ‘legal’ is to be understood in a wide sense, encompassing both the ‘law in 
the books’ and the ‘law in action’ (similar, for measuring institutions, Voigt, 2013). While it is 
clear that measuring the ‘law in action’ can be difficult, this approach was seen as preferable to a 
mere ‘law in books’ approach since the latter would disregard that the positive law may be un-
derenforced in some countries. 
It may also be contemplated to include non-legal variables related to history, culture or geog-
raphy as far as those may be regarded as good proxies for legal differences. For example, history 
can come into play since ‘legal traditions’ (e.g., Glenn, 2014; Derrett, 1968) may be decisive for 
the shape of the law today, such as the influence of Roman law on civil law (but also common 
law) countries and the relevance of colonial origins for many countries in the developing world 
(see Klerman et al., 2011 and Siems 2007: 76-80, comparing legal and colonial origins). Cultural 
and spatial proximity may be relevant as factors stimulating the diffusion of legal ideas across 
countries. However, it is difficult to say a priori how far such non-legal factors reflect legal dif-
ferences. Thus, in the choice of variables, preference has been given to variables that have a di-
rect legal dimension and measure the current law. 
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In order to go beyond the anecdotal classifications of the current legal literature, another aim 
was to include most legal systems of the world. The availability of legal datasets means that two 
limitations have to be acknowledged. First, the available datasets do not cover smaller jurisdic-
tions in Oceania and the Caribbean, as well as countries which do not take part in international 
surveys such as North Korea. Second, most of these datasets do not consider that there may be 
differences within one country. For example, while it is the case that the laws of Quebec, Louisi-
ana and Scotland are different from that of other parts of Canada, the US and the UK, legal data-
sets only provide a single number for each of those countries (the same applies to other sub-
national variations of the law). As a result, the dataset that will be described in the following 
covers 156 countries (with the names of those countries to be found in Table 7, below). 
 
3. Variables and descriptive statistics 
 
3.1 Variables of this study 
 
This study is based on 15 variables. The choice of these variables follows the considerations out-
lined in the previous section. More specifically, the variables can be divided into three main cat-
egories with five variables each (overview in Table 1, below). 
The first five variables aim to capture commonalities between groups of countries. Variable 
(1) considers whether countries consider themselves as belonging to the Latin Notariat (UINL), 
an organisation that aims to coordinate the work of notaries based on a ‘civilian’ notary system. 
Variable (2) on ‘Islam as state religion’ indicates whether Sharia law is likely to play at least 
some role in those countries. Variable (3) considers that the legal systems of the countries of the 
European Union (EU) – and those of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, as they belong to the 
European Economic Area (EEA) – are based to a large extent on EU law. This goes beyond the 
rules of other regional organisations. It also goes beyond a mere following of some EU laws by 
other countries (e.g., by Switzerland) since, in the EU, those common rules can also be enforced 
by judicial proceedings at the CJEU (and by the EFTA court for the EEA countries). 
To further consider the transnational and international dimension of today’s laws, variable (4) 
codes the participation of countries in international initiatives in matters of private and commer-
cial law, namely, the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Unidroit and the CISG, 
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with each of those accounting for 1/3 of the score. Variable (5) considers the increasing judiciali-
sation of international law. It codes the participation of countries in the International Court of 
Justice, the International Criminal Court and the WTO with its dispute settlement mechanism, 
again with each of those elements accounting for 1/3 of the score. 
The next five variables code attributes related to the general legal infrastructure of countries. 
Variable (6) addresses whether they adhere to the ‘rule of law’ based on the comprehensive data-
set developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010). It was also contemplated to include data on corruption; 
yet, the corresponding index by Transparency International is highly correlated with the rule of 
law index (0.95). It also needs to be acknowledged that such aggregated indicators have been 
subject to criticism (e.g., Voigt, 2013; Kurtz and Schrank, 2007). In the present case, it is sug-
gested, however, that it is helpful to include the ‘rule of law’ indicator since it can fill gaps left 
by the choice of some of the narrower indicators chosen for the purpose of this paper. 
Variable (7) on judicial independence may be seen as related. However, in order to provide a 
good mix between variables about the positive law and the law in practice, this variable is based 
on a dataset that codes the constitutional provisions decisive for judicial independence. Variable 
(8) considers another constitutional issue, namely whether countries have a separate constitu-
tional court. This variable was included because the existence or lack of a constitutional court 
may shape the general structure of highest courts in a country. It also reflects whether countries 
follow the position, originally developed by Hans Kelsen, that a separate constitutional court is 
necessary because ordinary courts only have the task of applying, but not evaluating, parliamen-
tary laws (see Ferreres Comella, 2011). A related variable may have considered the reliance on a 
career judiciary; yet, world-wide data on this topic are not available (see Garoupa and Ginsburg, 
2011). 
The subsequent two variables address legislation and law-making. Variable (9) codes whether 
countries have a Civil Code. The existence of such a code is important for the mentality of a le-
gal system since such a codification aims to be of a systematic and comprehensive nature. In 
general, it was straight-forward to code this variable. As the focus of this paper is on entire coun-
tries (see 2.3, above), Codes that are only in place in a minor part of federal countries were dis-
regarded (relevant for the US, Canada and Cameroon). For the six countries that only have a 
Code of Obligations this was coded as 0.5. Variable (10) considers democratic structures since in 
non-democratic countries ‘law’ and ‘politics’ tend to be less clearly separated than in democratic 
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ones. This relevance of the ‘rule of political law’ is also accepted in the taxonomy by Mattei 
(1997). 
The final five variables address specific areas of law – while, here too, the aim was to choose 
variables that relate to general themes and attitudes of legal systems. The extent of civil liberties 
violations, considered in variable (11), reflects the general relationship between the state and its 
citizens. Variable (12) on economic freedom aims to capture the general approach of countries 
towards less or more procedural formalities in business law. Variable (13) on labour freedom has 
the purpose to identify countries with a strong social orientation of the law, say, coordinated 
market economies, as opposed to purely liberal ones (see Hall and Soskice, 2001). This legal da-
taset was preferred to more economic or political proxies, such as data on the tax revenue, size of 
the government, left/right orientation or the Gini coefficient. The abolishment of the death pen-
alty of variable (14) intends to identify the ‘harshness’ of a country’s criminal law. Finally, vari-
able (15) codes the extent to which abortion is permitted in a particular jurisdiction. This variable 
aims to consider to what extent the law of a country tends to be more socially conservative or 
liberal. 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 summarises the 15 variables used in this paper, together with the sources, means, medi-
ans and standard deviations for 156 countries. In order to have a uniform measure, the variables 
were scaled from 0 to 1, if necessary.  
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Table 1: List of variables and descriptive statistics (n = 156)2 
 
Variables Sources Mean Median Std. deviation 
 
(1) Countries of Latin No-
tariat 
International Union of Nota-
ries 0.474 0.000 0.499 
(2) Islam state religion  
 
CIA World Factbook (and 
other sources) 0.115 0.000 0.319 
(3) EU / EEA countries European Union 0.192 0.000 0.394 
(4) Participation in interna-
tional commercial law Respective websites 0.455 0.333 0.403 
(5) Participation in interna-
tional courts Respective websites 0.643 0.667 0.321 
 
(6) Rule of law World Bank Governance In-dicators 0.450 0.377 0.265 
(7) Judicial independence 
(according to constitution)  
Comparative Constitutions 
Project 0.427 0.333 0.244 
(8) Constitutional court  Concourts.net 0.372 0.000 0.483 
(9) Civil Code Foreign Law Guide 0.686 1 0.454 
(10) Democracy index  Economist Intelligence Unit 0.495 0.525 0.254 
 
(11) Civil liberties in-
fringed Freedom House 0.397 0.333 0.300 
(12) Business freedom Heritage Foundation 0.584 0.578 0.204 
(13) Labour freedom Heritage Foundation 0.513 0.508 0.210 
(14) Death penalty not 
abolished  Amnesty International  0.269 0.000 0.444 
(15) Abortion permitted World Population Policies Database (UN) 0.598 0.571 0.354 
 
Table 2 highlights the variable pairs with the highest correlation coefficients (|0.50| or higher). It 
can be seen that the relationships between EU/EEA membership, participation in international 
commercial law, rule of law, democracy, civil liberties and business freedom tend to be among 
those correlations. It is also interesting to consider some of the other correlations: for example, 
countries where Islam is the state religion tend to have retained the death penalty (0.403); and 
countries with the death penalty also tend to infringe other civil liberties (0.432). 
 
                                                 
2
 Internet references for sources (data for 2013 unless indicated otherwise): (1) www.uinl.org; (2) 
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/; (3) to (5) websites of organisations; (6) 
www.govindicators.org; (7) http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ccp-rankings/ (most recent years); 
(8) www.concourts.net (own research for gaps); (9) http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/foreign-
law-guide; (10) www.eiu.com (2012 data); (11) www.freedomhouse.org; (12) and (13) 
www.heritage.org/index/explore (2014 data); (14) www.amnesty.org; (15) 
http://esa.un.org/PopPolicy/wpp_datasets.aspx. 
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Table 2: Correlations between the variables of Table 1 
 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) 1 -0.182 0.253 0.360 0.337 0.081 -0.024 0.305 0.545 0.221 -0.317 0.029 -.202 -.403 .110 
(2) -0.182 1 -0.176 -0.175 -0.328 -0.055 -0.180 -0.153 0.029 -0.302 0.357 0.033 .039 .414 -.229 
(3) 0.253 -0.176 1 0.592 0.442 0.629 -0.121 0.197 0.033 0.549 -0.591 0.450 -.019 -.296 .396 
(4) 0.360 -0.175 0.592 1 0.38 0.578 -0.004 0.239 0.051 0.629 -0.611 0.515 0.094 -0.267 0.467 
(5) 0.337 -0.328 0.442 0.38 1 0.39 0.069 -0.026 -0.065 0.548 -0.595 0.164 -0.035 -0.346 0.337 
(6) 0.081 -0.055 0.629 0.578 0.39 1 -0.117 0.004 -0.194 0.771 -0.737 0.737 .339 -.159 .396 
(7) -0.024 -0.180 -0.121 -0.004 0.069 -0.117 1 -0.016 -0.196 0.032 -0.038 -0.002 -.004 -.086 .061 
(8) 0.305 -0.153 0.197 0.239 -0.026 0.004 -0.016 1 0.372 0.008 -0.076 0.137 -.004 -.228 .242 
(9) 0.545 0.029 0.033 0.051 -0.065 -0.194 -0.196 0.372 1 -0.178 0.109 -0.156 -0.236 -0.121 0.545 
(10) 0.221 -0.302 0.549 0.629 0.548 0.771 0.032 0.008 -0.178 1 -0.926 0.600 .139 -.331 .344 
(11) -0.317 0.357 -0.591 -0.611 -0.595 -0.737 -0.038 -0.076 0.109 -0.926 1 -0.544 -.096 .432 -.367 
(12) 0.029 0.033 0.450 0.515 0.164 0.737 -0.002 0.137 -0.156 0.600 -0.544 1 .357 -.128 .514 
(13) -0.202 0.039 -0.019 0.094 -0.035 0.339 -0.004 -0.004 -0.236 0.139 -0.096 0.357 1 .137 .247 
(14) -0.403 0.414 -0.296 -0.267 -0.346 -0.159 -0.086 -0.228 -0.121 -0.331 0.432 -0.128 .137 1 -.191 
(15) 0.110 -0.229 0.396 0.467 0.337 0.396 0.061 0.242 0.545 0.344 -0.367 0.514 .247 -.191 1 
Avg 0.241 0.189 0.339 0.354 0.290 0.371 0.068 0.143 0.202 0.398 0.414 0.312 0.139 0.253 0.318 
 
The final line of Table 2 indicates the average absolute correlation of each of the 15 with the oth-
er 14 variables. It can be seen that none of the variables dominates the dataset. This is deliberate 
in order to avoid the risk that adding or dropping one of the variables would lead to a fundamen-
tally different result. 
 
 
4. Matrix, network presentation and analysis 
 
4.1. Method and matrix of differences 
 
In this paper, network analysis is seen as a method, not a particular substantive concept (for this 
distinction see Mische, 2011). Network analysis requires relational data. For example, the re-
search on ‘world systems’ uses data such as trade flows in order to establish the power relation-
ship between rich and poor countries (Lloyd et al., 2009, for an overview). 
The data of Table 1 describes attributes of countries. However, this data can also be presented 
as a relational dataset. For example, the variable about EU/EEA membership is akin to a variable 
about membership in the same intergovernmental organisation used in the world systems litera-
ture (Snyder and Kick, 1979; Kick et al., 2011). It is also possible to transform the other vari-
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ables into difference between each country pair. Such an approach of turning attributes into rela-
tions is described in network analysis books (e.g., Hanneman and Riddle, 2005: ch. 6; Knoke and 
Yang, 2008: 7) and is frequently used in political science and international relations (e.g., Som-
merer et al., 2008; also Siems, 2010, for an application to legal data). 
To elaborate, based on the variables of Table 1, it was calculated how different each variable 
in the law of a country is to the same variable in the law of the other 155 countries. Subse-
quently, the absolute values of these differences were added together and divided by 15. This lat-
ter procedure of creating a single index from multiple relations is also accepted in network 
analysis (e.g., Hanneman and Riddle, 2005: ch. 16; for examples from the world systems re-
search see Kick et al., 2011; Lloyd et al., 2009). 
The resulting adjacency matrix shows the average difference between each country pair. For 
example, in Table 3 it can be seen that Albania is closer to Armenia (average difference of 
0.111) than to Algeria, Angola, Argentina and Australia (average differences of 0.182, 0311, 
0.358 and 0.397). 
 
Table 3: Matrix of legal differences of each country pair (extract) 
 
 Albania Algeria Angola Argentina Armenia .. 
Albania 
     
… 
Algeria 0.358     … 
Angola 0.311 0.286    … 
Argentina 0.182 0.307 0.347   … 
Armenia 0.111 0.311 0.264 0.293  … 
Australia 0.397 0.578 0.531 0.362 0.423 … 
… … … … … … … 
 
The full matrix contains information about 1+2+3 … 156 = 12,090 country pairs. Figure 1 shows 
the distribution of this data. The mean difference between the country pairs is 0.34672. Four of 
the country pairs only have a difference of less than 0.025: Italy-Spain, Norway-Sweden, 
Finland-Sweden, and Hungary-Romania. It is suggested that these pairs illustrate the plausibility 
of the choice of variables as these most similar pairs are geographically close countries with 
similar legal, social and political structures. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of differences of country pairs 
 
 
 
4.2 Presentation of matrix as network  
 
The next step is to present the difference matrix graphically. For this purpose, the information 
about each of the pairs was entered into a network analysis program (UCINET) enabling the re-
searcher to represent only those ‘ties’ (i.e., relationships between countries) that are below a par-
ticular threshold (in other words, to dichotomise the network data).  
This was done for the value 0.15 which leads to the display of the closest 675 (ca. 5.6%) of 
the country pairs. Subsequently, the network analysis program was instructed to shift the position 
of countries according to the strength of their relationships based on the technique of ‘spring em-
bedding’, i.e., countries whose laws are relatively similar are moved closer together. 
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Figure 2: Network of world’s legal systems 
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Peru
Philippines
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Qatar
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Russia
Rwanda
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Senegal
Serbia
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Sri Lanka
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Starting at the top of the graph of Figure 2, there are some common law countries with the ones 
on the right densely connected to the Nordic countries. Clockwise, those countries are then 
loosely connected to a group of countries which are predominantly from continental Europe. 
Towards the bottom of the graph, those countries are connected to, mainly, transition economies 
from eastern Europe and central Asia, and towards the centre there are some connections to de-
veloping countries in Africa and Latin America. 
On the left centre and bottom of the graph we find many Muslim countries from the Middle 
East and North Africa, more or less well connected. Further to the top, there is then a connection 
between these countries and Bangladesh, Malaysia and Pakistan. Those latter countries are con-
nected to a dense group of common law countries from Africa and Asia, with Israel providing a 
link back to the European countries. Finally, on the top left it can be seen that three countries 
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(China, Taiwan and Thailand) are ‘isolates’, meaning that with a 0.15 threshold they are not con-
nected to any of the other countries.  
The limitation of Figure 2 is that it is based on the choice of this cut-off point and that it does 
not make use of the full information of the valued matrix. Fortunately, network analysis pro-
grams also enable an evaluation of this full information. The following analysis is therefore 
based on tools that do not rely on a particular cut-off point. 
 
4.3 Examining the relevance of legal origins 
 
According to research by financial economists, there are profound differences between English, 
French, German, Nordic and Socialist legal origin countries, explaining differences in financial 
development (see 2.1, above). To start with, this means that one would expect that the ‘origin 
countries’ England (i.e. here the UK, see 2.3, above). France and Germany are somewhere at the 
centre of the network (or, at least, form a well-connected hub within a group of countries). This 
question may invite tools such as calculation of degree or betweenness centrality or a core-
periphery analysis, but those tools work best for binary data (e.g., Hanneman and Riddle, 2005: 
ch. 10). Thus, in the present case of a valued dataset, it is preferable to calculate and then to rank 
the average difference of each country from the other 155 countries. Table 4 shows the five most 
‘mainstream’ and most ‘eccentric’ countries, as well as the position of France, Germany and the 
UK. 
 
Table 4: Rank of countries according to average difference (selection) 
1. Burkina Faso (0.279) 
2. Philippines (0.285) 
3. Panama (0.286) 
4. Nicaragua (0.288) 
5. Mozambique (0.289) 
… 
97. France (0.359)  … 
133. United Kingdom (0.392) 
136. Germany (0.396) … 
… 
152. Yemen (0.420) 
153. Saudi Arabia (0.423) 
154. Bahrain (0.423) 
155. Norway (0.433) 
156. Denmark (0.437) 
 
It can be seen that the three ‘origin countries’ are relatively ‘eccentric’, thus, casting doubts on 
the basis of the legal origin view. By contrast, many of the ‘most mainstream’ countries are 
countries in transition, possibly because those have legal institutions which have been shaped by 
various sources of influence and which provide an average level of protection, for example, as 
regards civil liberties and rule of law. 
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The alleged relevance of legal origins can also be examined at the aggregate level of the ‘legal 
origins’, based on the categories used in the La Porta et al. studies.3 For this purpose, Table 5 
reports the ‘density’ of the five legal origins which, for a valued network, refers to ‘the total of 
all values divided by the number of possible ties’ whereby ‘the density gives the average value.’4 
 
Table 5: Density of legal origins in network 
 
Countries  n Average density (and 
standard deviation) 
Comparison of density with density of all coun-
tries:5 z-score with significance level  
English legal origin 41 0.265 (0.095) -6.8170*** 
French legal origin 72 0.300 (0.120) -3.8537*** 
Socialist legal origin 32 0.227 (0.123) -4.5970*** 
German legal origin 6 0.246 (0.121) -1.5754* 
Nordic legal origin 5 0.049 (0.026) -20.9804*** 
All countries 156 0.347 (0.126) Note: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance levels 
 
The results of Table 5 show that the average density of each of the legal origins is lower than the 
density of all countries. In particular, there is strong evidence that the English, Socialist and Nor-
dic legal origins are denser than the average, with only weak evidence for the German legal ori-
gin. The observation that the Nordic countries are particularly close does not come as a surprise, 
as they are all developed countries with similar legal institutions. It is also plausible that English 
legal origin countries are denser than the countries of French and German legal origin since the 
former countries, but not most of the latter ones, share a common legal language and culture 
(Siems, 2008: 142-3). The strong significance of socialist legal origin may be less expected, 
given that it may be seen as one of today’s ‘weakening’ legal traditions (cf. Husa, 2004: 31, dis-
tinguishing ‘strengthening’ and ‘weakening’ legal families). 
 
                                                 
3
 The subsequent categories are based on La Porta et al., dataset for ‘Government Ownership of Banks’ 
(2002), available at http://faculty.tuck.dartmouth.edu/images/uploads/faculty/rafael-
laporta/Govt_Ownership_Banks.xls.  
4
 Definition at http://www.analytictech.com/ucinet/help/g75bzo.htm 
5
 The UCINET function is Networks > Compare densities > Against theoretical parameter. This uses a 
bootstrap method, see Hanneman and Riddle 2005: ch. 18. The significance level is based on the ‘propor-
tion of differences as small as observed’. 
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Table 6: Measures of cluster adequacy for legal origins 
 
Indicator Definitions6 Value 
Eta ‘Eta is the correlation between the data matrix and an ideal structure ma-
trix in which x(i,j)=1 if I and j are in the same cluster and 0 otherwise’ 
-0.327 
Q   ‘Newman and Girvan’s  modularity Q is the fraction of edges that fall 
within the partition minus the expected such fraction if the edges were 
distributed at random, Q has a maximum value of 1-1/m where m is the 
number of clusters. (…)’ 
-0.052 
Q-prime   ‘Q-prime is a normalized version of this’.  -0.065 
E-I    ‘Krackhardt and Stern’s E-I index is the number of external ties minus the 
number of internal ties divided by the total number of ties’. 
0.466 
 
However, the mere fact that the legal origins are not random does not mean that the dataset sup-
ports the legal-origin classification. Cluster adequacy indicators are a formal way to measure the 
fit of classifications. These indicators range from -1 to 1, similar to a correlation coefficient. For 
network data which show dissimilarities (as here) one can expect that the first three indicators 
are negative and that the final one is positive: this is the case in Table 6; however, all four indica-
tors are closer to 0 than to -1 or 1. This shows the limitations of the legal-origin taxonomy, and 
the need for a new classification of the legal systems of the world. 
 
 
5. Clusters of legal systems 
 
5.1 Identifying community structures  
 
Network analysis provides various tools to identify community structures (see, e.g., Ferligoj et 
al., 2011; Knoke and Yang, 2008: 77-91; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005: chs. 11 and 13). Some of 
those tools rely on binary data, but for a valued network it is preferable to use tools that consider 
the full information of the dataset. 
In the world-systems literature a common approach to identify groups in a valued network has 
been a method called CONCOR which stands for ‘convergence of iterated correlations’ (the 
seminal paper was Snyder and Kick, 1979; see also Kick et al., 2011). However, today, CON-
COR is technically outdated, with researchers preferring methods of ‘Tabu search’ (see, e.g., 
Lloyd et al., 2009: 59; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005: ch. 13). 
                                                 
6
 See http://www.analytictech.com/ucinet/help/hs3035.htm.  
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One such method is to calculate ‘optimisation clusters’. This refers to a formal method that 
‘optimises a cost function which measures the total distance or similarity within classes for a 
proximity matrix’.7 The user has to determine in advance how many clusters shall be created. 
Subsequently, she can compare the reported r-square in order to establish the best division for the 
dataset in question. This has been the approach of the following section. 
 
5.2 Clusters and maps of legal systems 
 
Table 7 reports the result for a division four clusters given that this provides the best fit for the 
current dataset, using density (defined as ‘the average value within clusters for similarity and the 
sum for distance data’) as the fit criterion. 
 
Table 7: Clusters of legal systems 
 
Group assignments (most typical countries of cluster in bold; least typical ones in italics) 
(1) European Legal 
Culture (38 countries) 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Rep., Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, Uruguay 
(2) Mixed Legal 
Systems (38 countries)  
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guyana, India, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uganda, United States, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
(3) Rule by Law (37 
countries) 
Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, China, 
Congo, Democratic Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Oman, Qatar, Rwanda, 
Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen 
                                                 
7
 Definition at http://www.analytictech.com/ucinet/help/2cvtid.htm. By contrast, Graff (2008) uses the La 
Porta et al. data for hierarchical clustering presented in a dendrogram. Yet, for 156 countries (as here) 
such a dendrogram would not be informative. 
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(4) Weak Law in 
Transition (43 
countries) 
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, 
Congo, Republic, Costa Rica, Côte d´Ivoire, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Indonesia, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Nicaragua, Niger, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Russia, Senegal, Suriname, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey 
 
Density table 
 1 2 3 4 
1 0.215 0.448 0.496 0.350  
2 0.448 0.231 0.338 0.361  
3 0.496 0.338 0.263 0.335  
4 0.350 0.361 0.335 0.210  
 
 
r-square = 0.291 
fit: 1356.315 
 
The four clusters of Table 7 have been given names that will be explained in the following. The 
Table also reports the density of the clusters. It can be seen that the differences within the clus-
ters (in bold) are always lower than the differences to the other clusters – which is precisely the 
aim of cluster optimisation. 
Figure 3: World map of clusters of legal systems 
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Figure 3 displays the clusters in a world map. It shows that, to some extent, geography is corre-
lated with the clusters since the countries of Europe and South America tend to belong to the 
same respective clusters. There is also some geographical clustering in Asia and Africa, while it 
does not confirm a common group of African legal systems – sometimes discussed in the litera-
ture (Menski, 2006; Siems, 2014: 83-84). 
It may be seen as problematic that the clusters pigeon-hole very diverse countries together. 
Specialised programs can identify overlapping groups of nodes in networks,8 but in the present 
case it is also revealing to calculate which three cluster members are the most and least typical 
ones, see Table 7.9 With respect to most typical countries it can be observed that in the first clus-
ter are continental European countries, in the second cluster are countries that are at the periph-
ery of the common law and in the third cluster are countries that have been politically unstable in 
recent history. 
In terms of the least typical countries of the respective clusters a plausible interpretation is 
that those countries are untypical because they are also close to one of the other clusters. For ex-
ample, with respect to the first two clusters, Japan could have also been in the mixed second 
cluster, while New Zealand may have joined Australia in the first cluster. Bahrain from the sec-
ond cluster could have belonged to the third cluster, and, with respect to the fourth cluster, Ma-
cedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina may be close to the European cluster. This intuition can be 
corroborated with a visual presentation of the clusters, akin to the cultural maps developed by 
Inglehart and Welzel (2010):  
 
                                                 
8
 See, e.g., CFinder, available at http://cfinder.org/.  
9
 In the present case of a valued network this approach is preferable to measures of centrality developed in 
network analysis. See 4.3, above. 
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Figure 4: Map of legal systems (with metric MDS)10 
 
 
Figure 4 is based on a ‘metric multidimensional scaling’ (MDS) of the legal systems. This is de-
fined as ‘given a matrix of proximities (similarities or dissimilarities) among a set of items, the 
program finds a set of points in k-dimensional space such that the Euclidean distances among 
these points corresponds as closely as possible to the input proximities’.11 The nodes were col-
oured and shaped according to the clusters (with lines between them added). In general, this was 
straight-forward, but see also the two enclaves (Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan) in the fourth cluster.  
                                                 
10
 This figure uses the IOC country codes as abbreviations, see http://www.statoids.com/wab.html. 
11
 See http://www.analytictech.com/ucinet/help/12ugzoc.htm. The UCINET function is Tools > Scal-
ing/Decomposition > Metric MDS (with the option ‘adjust data to nearest Euclidian’). 
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In substance, the countries that are at the borders of each cluster are particularly interesting: 
for example, it can be seen that New Zealand is indeed close to the other Anglophone countries, 
that Uruguay, South Korea and Chile are at the borders of the European cluster, and that Monte-
negro, Macedonia and Georgia are at the borders of the transition to the European cluster. 
The main cluster divisions, and their naming, can now be explained as follows. First, the ‘Eu-
ropean Legal Culture’ cluster mainly consists of European countries from any legal tradition: 
Germanic, French and Nordic civil law but also common law countries. Furthermore, it includes 
some non-European countries that have been strongly influenced by European legal systems and 
that perform well in institutional indicators. It can then also be seen that, within this cluster, the 
Anglophone and Nordic countries are close together – and a bit apart from the main group of 
continental countries. This result is not implausible as all of those latter countries share good in-
stitutions but without the comprehensive codes of (other) continental European countries. 
The second cluster is called ‘Mixed Legal Systems’ since it includes countries that have at 
least some features of common law systems but are also mixed with civil law and/or religious 
legal traditions. It also includes South Africa, Sri Lanka, Israel, Botswana, Guyana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, Zimbabwe and the Philippines which the literature often classifies as mixed legal sys-
tems (Kim, 2010: 705; for other mixtures see Siems, 2014: 85-93). The common-law nature of 
some countries of this cluster matches their history as former English colonies (e.g., India, 
Kenya), while for others this influence may be of more recent origins, possibly also through US 
law (e.g., the Philippines, Taiwan). It is also noteworthy that the US is at the far end of both this 
cluster and the chart, thus possibly confirming statements about the ‘exceptionalism’ of US law 
(e.g., Kagan, 2001). 
Third, the cluster ‘Rule by Law’ consists of many non-democratic countries, often with a 
communist background as well as some countries of Islamic law. These countries are loosely 
scattered over a relatively wide area of Figure 4. It can, however, be observed that the Muslim 
countries of the Middle East tend to be on the left hand side of the cluster, and that the central 
Asian countries are on the right hand side, closer to the ‘transition’ cluster. China is at the bottom 
end of this cluster, thus – similar to the US – possibly confirming research that China has a 
somehow unique institutional structure (see, e.g., Liebman, 2014). 
The fourth cluster, ‘Weak Law in Transition’, has been the most difficult to name. It includes 
a variety of countries from Latin America, Africa, Asia and South-East Europe. Many of the 
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countries in this cluster can be seen as countries in transition. Overall, these countries also have 
in common that they have decent but not perfectly working legal institutions, as will also be ap-
parent from the discussion of the following section. 
 
5.3 Relationship between clusters and variables 
 
In order to gain a fuller understanding of the clusters, it is helpful to identify which variables 
drive the results for each of these. Table 8 reports the means for each of the clusters, highlighting 
both the highest values (in bold) and the lowest ones (in italics). 
 
Table 8: Means of variables per each of the clusters 
 
Variables  
(1) Euro-
pean Legal 
Culture  
(2) Mixed 
Legal Sys-
tems  
(3) Rule by 
Law  
(4) Weak 
Law in 
Transition  
Total 
(1) Countries of Latin No-
tariat 0.711 0.000 0.135 0.977 0.474 
(2) Islam state religion  
 0.000 0.132 0.297 0.047 0.115 
(3) EU / EEA countries 0.789 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.192 
(4) Participation in interna-
tional commercial law 0.956 0.237 0.225 0.403 0.455 
(5) Participation in interna-
tional courts 0.904 0.614 0.333 0.705 0.643 
(6) Rule of law 0.791 0.431 0.259 0.330 0.450 
(7) Judicial independence 
(according to constitution)  0.360 0.583 0.324 0.438 0.427 
(8) Constitutional court  0.526 0.053 0.405 0.488 0.372 
(9) Civil Code 0.711 0.092 0.986 0.930 0.686 
(10) Democracy index  0.784 0.491 0.229 0.474 0.495 
(11) Civil liberties infringed 0.039 0.430 0.730 0.399 0.397 
(12) Business freedom 0.769 0.571 0.479 0.523 0.584 
(13) Labour freedom 0.541 0.570 0.499 0.450 0.513 
(14) Death penalty not 
abolished  0.026 0.474 0.568 0.047 0.269 
(15) Abortion permitted 0.861 0.538 0.514 0.492 0.598 
 
Table 8 shows that the countries of the first cluster have in common that they are typically (but 
not only) EU/EEA countries with high values in the categories international commercial law, 
participation in international law, rule of law, democracy, business freedom, and permission of 
abortions. Thus, this group is characterised by countries with broadly liberal, secular and effec-
tive legal systems. 
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With respect to the mixed second cluster, the low values in the variables on Latin Notariat, 
constitutional court and Civil Code and the high value in the constitutional provision of judicial 
independence can be seen as common-law indicators. But these countries are also quite different 
from contemporary UK (or English) law with low or intermediate values for rule of law, civil 
liberties, democracy, business freedom, as well as retention of the death penalty. Thus, this 
shows a certain tension between existing traditions and effective protection of rights. 
The scores in the variables of the third cluster confirm the features of a ‘rule by law’: low val-
ues on rule of law, judicial independence and democracy, many civil rights infringements and a 
harsh criminal law (as seen by the retention of the death penalty and the ban of abortion). While 
almost all of those countries have Civil Codes, it is noteworthy that they do not tend to partici-
pate in the Latin Notariat, international commercial law and international courts. Overall, this 
leads to a cluster of countries that are furthest apart from the cluster of the European legal culture 
– and those are indeed the only two clusters that do not share a border in Figure 4. 
In some respects the fourth cluster is similar to the previous one, for instance, with a low 
score for rule of law and a high one for Civil Code. However, almost all of these countries have 
abolished the death penalty and score higher in terms of judicial independence, democracy and 
respect for civil liberties. In addition, the association with the Latin Notariat and the greater 
readiness to participate in international commercial law and international courts shows a willing-
ness to improve their legal infrastructure. Thus, in the future, some of these countries may shift 
to the cluster of the European legal culture – as it may be assumed that some of the countries in 
the latter cluster (such as Uruguay, Chile, Croatia, Serbia) may have gone through this transition 
in recent decades. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has explored a new dataset of 156 legal systems with tools of network and cluster 
analysis. Network analysis can indicate similarities between country pairs which can show how 
the law of one country has been influenced by two or more other countries. Moreover, even 
when we identify community structures such as clusters, this does not deny possible ambiguities. 
As this paper has shown, the clusters of ‘European Legal Culture’, ‘Mixed Legal Systems’, the 
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‘Rule by Law’, and the ‘Weak Law in Transition’ can be displayed in a map with countries that 
are close to the borders of their respective clusters, thus indicating complex sources of influence.  
This analysis therefore confirms the first reason to develop taxonomies of legal systems (see 
2.2, above), namely that, at the descriptive level, the foregoing findings are helpful in order to 
identify the main dividing lines of the legal systems of the world. Of course, this does not mean 
that those categories are necessarily relevant for each and every legal concept. Thus, researchers 
may use the taxonomy as a starting point but may then also discuss how far it does, or does not, 
capture any specific legal concept of interest. 
Second, analytically, the network data presented here may be linked to further datasets. The 
current paper was based on the idea that attributes can be transformed into relations showing dif-
ferences and similarities between countries. Future research can identify how these data are re-
lated to explicit data on legal relations, for example, cross-citations between courts (e.g., Gelter 
and Siems, 2013) or technological, social, biological and information networks (for those net-
works see Kolaczyk, 2009: 3-10). 
Moreover, it can be scrutinised how the legal networks and clusters are correlated to histori-
cal, social, political, economic and cultural similarities and differences. For example, applying 
the concept of an ‘affiliation network’ aims to identify a shared event that indicates the presence 
of particular ties (see Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). It would also be interesting to establish 
whether there may be a causal relationship between the clusters and economic development. 
However, this raises the problem of law’s endogeneity (see, e.g., Deakin 2015). While the ‘legal 
origins’ of the law and finance research may, to some extent, be seen as exogenous, La Porta et 
al. (2008: 298), now also acknowledge that using them as instrumental variables can be inappro-
priate and that they may actually proxy for other channels. 
Third, there may be normative lessons that can be drawn from the analysis of this paper. For 
example, the fact that the data have led to a mainly European cluster of different legal traditions 
indicates that within this group EU harmonisation may be less problematic than it is sometimes 
assumed (Legrand, 1996). Considering the use of foreign legal models, it is conceivable that a 
country may have a tendency to transplant rules from neighbouring countries in the map of legal 
systems of Figure 4.  However, it could also be the case that a country has the aim to change its 
position in this map: for example, adopting the view that ‘getting to Denmark’ equates the desire 
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to move to the model of ‘stable, peaceful, prosperous, inclusive, and honest societies’ (Fuku-
yama, 2011: 12), the aspiration would be to get towards the top right hand corner of Figure 4. 
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